The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm? by Arner, DW et al.
Title The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?
Author(s) Arner, DW; Barberis, JN; Buckley, RP
Citation
Issued Date 2015
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/221450
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2676553 
1 
 
 
The Evolution of FinTech:  
A New Post-Crisis Paradigm? 
 
Douglas W. Arner
*
 
Jànos Barberis
**
 
Ross P. Buckley
***
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
“Financial technology” or “FinTech” refers to technology enabled financial solutions. 
FinTech is often seen today as the new marriage of financial services and information 
technology. However, the interlinkage of finance and technology has a long history and has 
evolved over three distinct eras. FinTech 1.0, from 1866 to 1987, was the first period of 
financial globalization supported by technological infrastructure such as transatlantic 
transmission cables. This was followed by FinTech 2.0, from 1987-2008, during which 
financial services firms increasingly digitized their processes. Since 2008 a new era of 
FinTech has emerged in both the developed and developing world. This era is defined not by 
the financial products or services delivered but by who delivers them. This latest evolution of 
FinTech, led by start-ups, poses challenges for regulators and market participants alike, 
particularly in balancing the potential benefits of innovation with the possible risks of new 
approaches. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Financial technology” or “FinTech” refers to the use of technology to deliver financial 
solutions. The term’s origin can be traced to the early 1990s and referred to the “Financial 
Services Technology Consortium”, a project initiated by Citigroup in order to facilitate 
technological cooperation efforts.
1
 However, it is only since 2014
2
 that the sector has 
attracted the focused attention of regulators, industry participants and consumers alike. The 
term now refers to a large and rapidly growing industry representing between US$12 billion
3
 
and US$197 billion
4
 in investment as of 2014, depending on whether one considers start-ups 
(FinTech 3.0) or traditional financial institutions (FinTech 2.0).
5
 This rapid growth has 
attracted greater regulatory scrutiny, which would seem warranted given the fundamental role 
FinTech plays in the functioning of finance and its infrastructure. 
 
FinTech today is often seen as a uniquely recent marriage of financial services and 
information technology. However, the interlinkage of finance and technology has a long 
history. In fact, financial and technological development have long been intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 was a watershed and is part of the 
reason FinTech is now evolving into a new paradigm.
6
 This new evolution poses challenges 
for regulators and market participants alike, particularly in balancing the potential benefits of 
innovation with the potential risks. The challenge of this balancing act is nowhere more acute 
than in the developing world, particularly Asia.
7
 
 
This paper analyses the evolution of, and outlook for, the FinTech sector and considers the 
regulatory implications of its growth. It does so by first considering the interlinked evolution 
of financial services and technology, in particular information technology. The FinTech 
                                                 
1
 See Marc Hochstein, "Fintech (the Word, That Is) Evolves" (5 October 2015) The American Banker available 
at <http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/fintech-the-word-that-is-evolves-1077098-1.html> 
2
 A Google trend search reveals that the interest over time for the word “FinTech” increased exponentially in 
2014, available at <https://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=fintech >  
3
 See Chloe Wang, “Financial technology booms as digital wave hits banks, insurance firms” (28 May 2015) 
Channel News Asia, available at <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/singapore/financial-
technology/1875644.html> 
4
 See Gareth Lodge, Hua Zhang and Jacob Jegher, “IT Spending in Banking: A Global Perspective” (5 February 
2015) Celent, available at <http://www.celent.com/reports/it-spending-banking-global-perspective-2> 
5
 The reason behind the range will be explained in the paper and comes from the distinction between FinTech 
2.0 and FinTech 3.0  
6
 See Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis, “Regulation of FinTech Innovation: A Balancing Act” (1 April 2015) 
available at <http://www.law.hku.hk/aiifl/regulating-fintech-innovation-a-balancing-act-1-april-1230-130-pm/> 
7
 See Ray Chan, “Asian Regulator Seek FinTech Balance” (4 September 2015) Finance Asia, available at  
<http://www.financeasia.com/News/401588,asian-regulators-seek-fintech-balance.aspx> 
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environment is then explored in the broader evolutionary context, which is necessary to 
understand its current status and possible future development (sections 2 to 4). The 
evolutionary analysis is then used to develop a topology of the FinTech landscape today 
(section 3), focusing particularly on the impact of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and 
related post-crisis regulatory developments. Section 5 considers the example of the 
developing world, particularly Africa and Asia Pacific, where FinTech developments have 
become a central feature of financial market development. Section 6 highlights the necessity 
for regulators to interact pro-actively with industry so as to perform and uphold their 
mandates, in particular through the development of “regulatory technology” or “RegTech”. 
The final section seeks to provide a framework to understand how a balancing between 
financial technology and regulation can be achieved. 
 
 
2.  FinTech: New Term for an Old Sector 
 
At the broadest level, FinTech refers to the application of technology to finance. This 
definition gives rise to three specific observations.  
 
First, FinTech is not an inherently novel development for the financial services industry. 
Indeed, the introduction of the telegraph (first commercial use in 1838)
8
 and the laying of the 
first successful transatlantic cable in 1866
9
 (by the Atlantic Telegraph Company) provided 
the fundamental infrastructure for the first major period of financial globalization in the late 
19
th
 century. This period is usually seen as running from around 1870, with the laying of the 
transatlantic cable and other similar connections to the onset of the First World War. 
Subsequently, the introduction of the Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) in 1967 by Barclays 
Bank
10
 arguably marks the commencement of the modern evolution of today’s FinTech. The 
impact of ATMs led Paul Volcker, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve (1979-1987), 
in commenting on the role of financial innovation in the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, to 
famously say in 2009:  
 
                                                 
8
 See G. Barbiroli, “The Dynamic of Technology: A Methodological Framework for Tehcno-Analyse” (1997) 
Springer, page 58 
9
 See Jill Hills, “The Struggle for Control of Global Communication: The formative Century” (2002) University 
of Illinois Press, page 35 
10
 See Thomas Lerner, “Mobile Payment” (2013) Springer, page 3 
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The most important financial innovation that I have seen the past 20 years is the 
automatic teller machine, that really helps people and prevents visits to the bank and it 
is a real convenience.
11
 
 
Second, the financial services industry has been one of the prime purchasers of IT products 
and services globally, with total spending at over US$ 197 billion in 2014.
12
 This is not a 
recent trend and dates back to the mid-1990s, when the financial services industry became the 
single largest purchaser of IT, a position it retains to this day. Thus, for at least twenty years, 
traditional financial services have been a driving force in the IT industry and this trend is not 
slowing as the industry is in fact predicted to double its IT spending.
13
 Since the late 1980s, 
finance has been an industry based upon transmission and manipulation of digital 
information. The ATM in fact is often the only point for most consumers today at which 
finance transitions from a purely digital experience to one that involves a physical 
commodity (i.e. cash). 
 
Third, the term FinTech is not confined to specific sectors (e.g. financing) or business models 
(e.g. peer-to-peer (P2P) lending), but instead covers the entire scope of services and products 
traditionally provided by the financial services industry, a topic discussed in greater detail in 
section 4.  
 
This historical perspective, however, does not explain the reason for the increase in activity 
and rising concerns of policy-makers
14
 or the industry itself.
15
 As “FinTech” is not a new 
story, its opportunities, risks and legal implications should not be novel; and, such is the case, 
                                                 
11
 See Paul Volcker, “The Only thing useful banks have invented in 20 years in the ATM” (13 December 2009) 
The New York Post, available at: <http://nypost.com/2009/12/13/the-only-thing-useful-banks-have-invented-in-
20-years-is-the-atm/>  
12See Gareth Lodge, Hua Zhang and Jacob Jegher, “IT Spending in Banking: A Global perspective” (5 February 
2015) Celent, available at: <http://www.celent.com/reports/it-spending-banking-global-perspective-2>  
13
 See Elliot Holley, “Digitalisation will double bank IT spending in next four years” (23 September 2015) 
Banking Technology, available at <http://www.bankingtech.com/374051/digitalisation-will-double-bank-it-
spending-says-gartner/>  
14
 The UK government Chief Technology Advisor looking at the implications and benefits of FinTech from a 
regulatory standpoint;
14
 the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) announcing a US$ 160 million investment 
for research into the topic. See Shiwen Yap, “MAS commits $225million to FinTech growth in Singapore” (2 
July 2015) Deal Street Asia, available at: <http://www.dealstreetasia.com/stories/mas-commits-225m-to-fintech-
growth-in-singapore-8637/> 
15
 Goldman Sachs estimating FinTech industry puts US$ 4 trillion of revenues at risk. See Anna Irrera, “FN 
FinTech Focus: Disruptor’s $4tr fortune” (20 March 2015) Efinancial News, available at 
<http://thetally.efinancialnews.com/2015/03/fn-fintech-focus-much-finance-incumbents-stand-lose-disruptors/> 
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as in 1985 in Electronic Banking: The Legal Implications,
16
 Sir Roy Goode and others 
considered the legal consequences of the increased use of electronic payments and 
authentications in banking. Rather, the current concerns of policy makers and industry arise 
not from the technology itself but from who is applying the technology to finance. Since 2008 
there has been rapid expansion in the types of businesses that create and deliver technology to 
provide financial services and products.
17
  
 
It is important to distinguish three main eras of FinTech evolution. From around 1866 to 
1987, the financial services industry, while heavily interlinked with technology, remained 
largely an analogue industry, at least in public perception, a period which we characterize as 
FinTech 1.0. By 1987 at the latest, however, financial services at least in developed countries 
had become not only once again highly globalized, but also digital. This period, which we 
characterize as FinTech 2.0, continued until 2008. During this period, FinTech was 
dominated primarily by the traditional regulated financial services industry that used 
technology to provide financial products and services. However, since 2008 (the period we 
characterize as “FinTech 3.0”) this is no longer necessarily the case. New start-ups and 
established technology companies have begun to deliver financial products and services 
directly to businesses and the general public.  
 
2.1 FinTech 1.0 (1866-1987): From analogue to digital 
 
As noted at the outset, finance and technology have long been interlinked and mutually 
reinforcing from their earliest stages of development. Finance has its origins in administrative 
systems for state administration necessary in the transition from hunter-gather groups to 
settled agricultural states, for instance in the context of Mesopotamia, in which some of the 
earliest examples of written records evidence financial transactions.
18
 Thus, there has been a 
clear linkage between finance and technology, in this instance from the mutually reinforcing 
process of the development of finance and written records, one of the earliest forms of 
information technology. Similarly, the development of money itself and finance are clearly 
                                                 
16
 R. M. Goode & Institute of Bankers (Great Britain), “Electronic banking: The legal implications” (1985) 
London: Institute of Bankers. 
17
 See Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis, “Regulation of FinTech Innovation: A Balancing Act” (1 April 2015) 
AIIFL available at <http://www.law.hku.hk/aiifl/regulating-fintech-innovation-a-balancing-act-1-april-1230-
130-pm/> 
18
 Matthew Rowlinsson, “Real Money and Romanticism” (2010) Cambridge University Press, page 7 
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intertwined, with fiat currency (a technology evidencing transferable values)
19
 being one of 
the defining characteristics of a modern economy as well as one of the core areas of FinTech 
today. One sees a similar process in the emergence of early technologies for calculation such 
as the abacus and of course numbers and mathematics themselves. This evolutionary 
development can also be seen in the context of trade, with finance evolving from an early 
stage both to support trade (e.g. financing and insuring ships and infrastructure such as 
bridges, railroads and canals) as well as in supporting the production of goods for that trade. 
Certainly, double entry accounting
20
 – another technology fundamental to a modern economy 
– emerged from the intertwined evolution of finance and trade in the late Middle Ages and 
the Renaissance. 
 
Many historians today share the view that the financial revolution in Europe in the late 1600s 
involving joint stock companies, insurance and banking, played an essential role in the 
Industrial Revolution.
21
 In this context, finance supported the development of technologies 
that underpinned industrial development.
 
 
 
2.1.1 The first age of financial globalization 
 
In the late 19
th
 century finance and technology combined to produce the first period of 
financial globalization that lasted until the beginning of the First World War. During this 
period, technology such as the telegraph, railroads, canals and steamships underpinned 
financial interlinkages across borders, allowing rapid transmission of financial information, 
transactions and payments around the world. The financial sector at the same time had 
provided the necessary resources to develop the telegraphs, railroads, canals, steamships and 
other technologies. J.M. Keynes, writing in 1920, gave a clear picture of the interlinkage 
between finance and technology in this first age of financial globalization: 
                                                 
19
 Indeed, one can make the argument that paper is a technology that allows to store value. The same size bank 
note can “store” US$10 or US$100 and be worth this much as long as there is a state or central bank 
guaranteeing the bearer of the note to be paid. Thus the amount written on the bank note itself has theoretically 
no limit, indeed Zimbabwe is (in)famously known for have a Z$ 100 trillion (100,000,000,000,000) bank note. 
20
 On the accounting side, the blockchain technology is akin to the double entry book keeping system, as any 
transaction processed via the blockchain is registered and sent to the whole network which can then be re-
accessed for auditing purposes. Importantly and unlike traditional book keeping, because blockchain accounting 
is decentralized the capacity to fake a transaction is very complicated as it would require to amend the record on 
the whole blockchain network, which is not only complicated but very costly and thus may remove the 
economic rational of the fraud. See Matthew Spoke, “How Blockchain Tech Will Change Auditing for Good” 
(11 July 2015) Coin Desk, available at <http://www.coindesk.com/blockchains-and-the-future-of-audit/>  
21
 Charles Moore, “Understanding the industrial Revolution” (2002) Routledge, page 36 
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The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea 
in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might 
see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his door-step; he 
could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in 
the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and 
share, without exertion or even trouble.
22
 
 
2.1.2 The early post-war period 
 
During the post-war period, while financial globalization was constrained for several 
decades, technological developments, particularly those arising from wartime, proceeded 
rapidly, especially in communications and information technology. In the context of 
information technology, code-breaking tools were developed commercially into early 
computers by firms such as International Business Machines (IBM), and the handheld 
financial calculator was first produced by Texas Instruments in 1967.
23
 The 1950s also 
marked the period where Americans were introduced to credit cards (Diners’ Club, in 1950, 
Bank of America and American Express in 1958).
24
 This consumer revolution was further 
supported by the initial establishment of the Interbank Card Association (now MasterCard) in 
the US in 1966.
25
 By 1966, a global telex network was in place, providing the fundamental 
communications necessary on which to build the next stage of FinTech development. The 
first commercial version of the successor of the telex, the fax machine, was introduced by the 
Xerox Corporation in 1964 under the name of Long Distance Xerography (LDX).
26
 As noted 
previously, 1967 marked the deployment of the first ATM by Barclays in the UK. 
 
2.1.3 The modern foundations: 1967-1987 
 
The launch of the calculator and the ATM in 1967 began the modern period of FinTech 1.0. 
1967-1987 was a time when financial services moved from an analogue to a digital industry. 
                                                 
22
 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1920, pp. 10 –12. 
23
 See Patrick Thibodeau, “TI’s first handheld calculator is now a museum piece” (26 September 2007) 
Computer World, available at <http://www.computerworld.com/article/2541155/computer-hardware/ti-s-first-
handheld-calculator-is-now-a-museum-piece.html>  
24
 Jerry W. Markham, “A Financial History of the United States: From Christopher Columbus to the Robber 
Barons” (2002) M.E. Sharpe, page 306 
25
 A good recollection of the history of the credit card industry was covered by Ben Woolsey and Emily 
Starbuck Gerson, “The History of Credit Cards” (11 May 2009) Credit Cards available at 
<http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-cards-history-1264.php>  
26
 Similarly, “The History of Fax: from 1983 to present days” provides a comprehensive perspective on the 
origin and evolution of the technology. Available at <http://faxauthority.com/fax-history/>  
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Key developments set the foundations for the second period of financial globalization, which 
were clearly signposted by the global reaction to the 1987 stock market crash in the US. 
 
In the area of payments, the Inter-Computer Bureau was established in the UK in 1968, 
forming the basis of today’s BACS (Bankers’ Automated Clearing Services),27 while the US 
CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System) was established in 1970. Fedwire, 
originally established in 1918, became an electronic instead of a telegraphic system in the 
early 1970s. Reflecting the need to interconnect domestic payments systems across borders, 
SWIFT (Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) was established in 
1973,
28
 followed soon after by the collapse of Herstatt Bank in 1974, which clearly 
highlighted the risks of increasing international financial interlinkages, particularly through 
the new payments system technology. This crisis triggered the first major regulatory focus on 
FinTech issues in the form of a series of international soft law agreements on developing 
robust payments systems and related regulation. The combination of finance, technology and 
appropriate regulatory attention is the basis of today’s US$ 5.4 trillion a day global foreign 
exchange market,
29
 the largest, most global and most digitized component of the global 
economy. 
 
In the area of securities, the establishment of NASDAQ
30
  in the US in 1971
31
 , and the end 
of fixed securities commissions and the eventual development of the National Market System 
marked the transition from physical trading of securities dating to the late 1600s to today’s 
fully electronic securities trading. In the consumer area, online banking was first introduced 
in the US in 1980 (although abandoned in 1983) and in the UK in 1983 by the Nottingham 
Building Society (NBS).
32
 
 
                                                 
27
 Brian Welch, “Electronic Banking and Treasury Security” (1999) Elsevier, page 48 
28
 See SWIFT, “SWFIT History” (2014) available at 
 <http://www.swift.com/about_swift/company_information/swift_history>  
29
 See Jessica Mortimer, “Table-Global FX Volume reaches $5.3 trillion a day in 2013” (5 Sept 2013) Reuters, 
available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/bis-survey-volumes-idUSL6N0GZ34R20130905>. By 
comparison in Hong Kong at the same period it was $274 billion that was exchanged every day (Dec 2013) 
HKMA, available at <http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/publication-and-research/quarterly-
bulletin/qb201312/fa2.pdf>  
30
 (acronym for National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations) 
31
 See NASDAQ, “Celebrating 40 years of NASDAQ: from 1971 to 2011” (2011) NASDAQ, available at 
<http://www.nasdaq.com/includes/celebrating-40-years-nasdaq40-from-1971-to-2011.aspx>  
32
 Harry Choron and Sandy Choron, “Money: Everything You Never Knew About Your Favorite Thing to Find, 
Save, Spend & Covet” (2011) Chronicle Books, page 22 
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Throughout this period, financial institutions increased their use of IT in their internal 
operations, gradually replacing most forms of paper-based mechanisms by the 1980s, as 
computerization proceeded and risk management technology developed to manage internal 
risks. One early example of a form of FinTech innovation is very familiar today to financial 
professionals. Michael Bloomberg started Innovation Market Solutions (IMS) in 1981 after 
leaving Solomon Brothers, where he had designed in-house computer systems.
33
 By 1984, 
Bloomberg terminals were in ever-increasing usage among financial institutions. 
 
Traditional financial services firms are thus clearly a central aspect of FinTech. As Yang 
Kaisheng CEO at Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the largest bank in the 
world by market share and asset size, has recently observed:  
There is a perception that when banks develop internet technology, it is not 
regarded as FinTech. Some people say this is a new idea, a new ideology 
that will get rid of agents and intermediaries and that banks can’t adapt.34 
As one example, approximately one third of Goldman Sachs’ 33,000 staff are engineers – 
more than LinkedIn, Twitter or Facebook.
35
 Paul Walker, Goldman Sachs’ global technology 
co-head that they “were competing for talents with start-ups and tech companies”36  
 
3. FinTech 2.0 (1987-2008): Development of Traditional Digital Financial Services  
 
1987 marked a new period of regulatory attention to the risks of cross-border financial 
interconnections and their intersection with technology. One of the iconic images from this 
period is that of the investment banker wielding an early mobile telephone (first introduced in 
the US in 1983) perfectly illustrated in Oliver Stone’s film Wall Street in 1987. That same 
year also marks the ”Black Monday” stock market crash whose effect on markets around the 
world clearly showed they were interlinked through technology in a way not seen since the 
1929 crash. While almost 30 years later there is still no clear consensus on the causes of the 
crash, much focus at the time was placed on the use by financial institutions of computerized 
trading systems which bought and sold automatically based on pre-set price levels (“program 
                                                 
33
 IMS was called a “Financial Information” company and not yet a “Financial Technology” company. See 
Benjamin Wachenje, “Michael Bloomberg: Wall Street Data Pioneer and ex-NYC Major (29 April 2014) 
CNBC, available at <http://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/29/25-michael-bloomberg.html>   
34
 See Jame DiBiasio, “ICBC Chairman welcomes FinTech Reg” (17 August 2015) Finance Asia, available at 
<http://www.financeasia.com/News/400732,icbc-chairman-welcomes-fintech-regs.aspx>  
35
 See, Jonathan Marino, “Goldman Sachs is a Tech Company” (12 April 2015) Business Insider, available at < 
http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-sachs-has-more-engineers-than-facebook-2015-4>  
36
 Ibid 
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trading”). The reaction led to the introduction of a variety of mechanisms, particularly in 
electronic markets, to control the speed of price changes (“circuit breakers”). It also led 
securities regulators around the world to begin working on mechanisms to support 
cooperation, in the way that the 1974 Herstatt crisis and the 1982 developing country debt 
crisis triggered greater cooperation between bank regulators in respect to cross-border issues. 
 
In addition, the Single European Act of 1986 came into effect, establishing the framework for 
the establishment of a single financial market in the European Union (from 1992), and the 
Big Bang financial liberalization process in the UK in 1986, combined with the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty and an ever increasing number of financial services Directives and 
Regulations from the late 1980s, set the baseline for the eventual full interconnection of EU 
financial markets by the early 21
st
 century. 
  
Certainly, by the late 1980s, financial services had become largely a digital industry, based 
on electronic transactions between financial institutions, financial market participants and 
customers around the world, with the fax largely having supplemented the telex. By 1998, 
financial services had become for all practical purposes the first digital industry. This time 
also showed the initial limits and risks in complex computerized risk management systems 
(e.g. Value at Risk (VaR)), with the collapse of Long-term Capital Management (LTCM) in 
the wake of the Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997-1998. 
 
However, it was the emergence of the Internet that set the stage for the next level of 
development, beginning in 1995 with Wells Fargo using the World Wide Web (WWW) to 
provide online account checking.
37
 By 2001, eight banks in the US had at least one million 
customers online, with other major jurisdictions around the world rapidly developing similar 
systems and related regulatory frameworks to address risk. By 2005, the first direct banks 
without physical branches emerged (e.g. ING Direct, HSBC Direct) in the UK.  
 
By the beginning of the 21
st
 century, both banks’ internal processes, interactions with 
outsiders and an ever increasing number of their interactions with retail customers had 
become fully digitized, facts highlighted by the significance of IT spending by the financial 
services industry. In addition, regulators were ever more using technology, especially in the 
                                                 
37
 See Charles Riggs, “Wells Fargo: 20 Years of internet Banking” (18 May 2015) Wells Fargo, available at 
<https://blogs.wellsfargo.com/guidedbyhistory/2015/05/internet-20-years/>   
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context of securities exchanges, which by 1987 had become the most common source of 
information regarding market manipulation, based upon their computerized trading systems 
and records. 
 
3.1 Regulatory approaches to traditional DFS in FinTech 2.0 
 
As an example of regulatory interest in related developments, David Carse, then Deputy 
Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), gave a keynote address in 
1999 where he considered the new regulatory framework needed for e-banking.
38
 It is 
important to note that this speech was given in 1999, whilst e-banking had been around since 
1980.  
 
This time lag highlights the delay in regulatory reaction to technological changes. This lag is 
to be expected, and often welcomed as it is consistent with efficient market regulation.
39
 
There is limited benefit in regulating all new innovations applicable to the financial sector.
40
 
Pre-emptive regulation would not only increase the workload of regulatory agencies and tend 
to stifle innovation severely, but would also have limited benefits. Therefore, regulatory re-
action is to be expected and can arguably be beneficial in allowing the emergence of a new 
industry or channel. 
 
The regulatory view during FinTech 2.0 was that whilst e-banking was simply a digital 
version of the traditional brick and mortar banking model, it did create new risks. By 
providing direct and virtually unlimited access to their accounts, technology removed the 
necessity for depositors to be physically present at a branch to withdraw funds. Indirectly, 
this could facilitate electronic bank runs as the lack of physical interaction removes the 
friction from a withdrawal. In turn this can increase the stress on a financial institution that 
has liquidity problems during a banking crisis: 
                                                 
38
 David Carse, “Keynote: Regulatory Framework of e-banking” (8 October 1999) HKMA, available at 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r991012c.pdf>  
39
 For more details on this point please see section 6.2 
40
 In this respect, it is useful to compare Hong Kong to the Singaporean approach. Indeed, whilst the Octopus 
Card Network (contactless store value facility) has been mainly developed by the private sector, its Singaporean 
equivalent ENZ-Link was pushed as the standard by the government. In other words, whilst Hong Kong 
regulators tend to be more technology agnostic, Singapore seems to be driven more by a top-down vision on the 
use of technology within the country. This observation would also echo the current developments within 
FinTech whereby Singapore has been much more public as to the government initiatives in that space (e.g. US$ 
225million to be invested in research to 75% of operating cost of FinTech accelerators subsidized).  
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An internet-based bank is faced with the same types of banking risk as its 
traditional counterparties. In some ways, the internet may heighten these 
risks. For example, the ability to transfer funds between different bank 
accounts may increase deposit volatility and could, in extreme situations, 
lead to “virtual bank runs”. Banks will need to build this possibility into 
their liquidity management policies.
41
  
 
Regulators also identified that online banking creates new credit risks. Through the removal 
of the physical link between the consumer and the bank, it was anticipated that competition 
would increase (e.g. borrowers would have access to a greater pool of lenders as they were no 
longer limited to a specific geographical location). Whilst prima facie positive for consumers, 
this competitive pressure may also be problematic from a financial stability point of view. 
The US provided a telling example of this with the deregulation of its banking market during 
the 1980s.
42
 Second, the constraints arising from being known personally by a loan officer are 
lost as the loan origination decision may be replaced by an automated system.  
 
On the beneficial side, it was rightly noted that better organized data could lead to an 
improved understanding of the borrowers’ true credit risk and allow the offering of products 
better aligned to the risk profile of the consumer. This insight pre-empted the emergence of 
big-data analysis that provides more granular insights into consumers’ profiles.43 However, 
the comparison stops here, because Carse’s speech was built on the premise that these 
technological innovations would be used by licensed financial intuitions only. This 
distinction is key to understanding the turning point between FinTech 2.0 and FinTech 3.0. 
 
                                                 
41
 David Carse, “Keynote: Regulatory Framework of e-banking” (8 October 1999) HKMA, page 4 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r991012c.pdf> 
42
 The preamble of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act [1980] “provides for the 
gradual elimination of all limitations on the rates of interest”. In practice this meant that interest payable on 
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consequence of removing the bank’s guaranteed profit generated by the spread between interest payable (e.g. 
deposits) and chargeable (e.g. loans). In turn this forced banks to make up for the loss in revenue, previously 
guaranteed by the cap of interest rates, by shifting towards higher risk activities (e.g. sub-prime lending) or 
moving away from interest-based income (e.g. fees generated by loan securitization).  
43
 This vision of a data-led regulatory system is not new. Back in 2009 the SEC created the division for 
Economic and Risk Analysis under the supervision of Henry Hu
43
, looking at driving data insight for better 
regulation. However, it seems clear that since 2007 there has been an increase in activity emanating from 
regulators, industry and academia alike on this topic. For more details on RegTech please refer to Douglas Arner 
and Janos Barberis chapter “FinTech in China: From Shadow Banking to P2P Lending”, in Banking Beyond 
Banks & Money” (Springer 2015 forthcoming).  
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During this FinTech 2.0 period, the expectation was that the providers of e-banking solutions 
would be supervised financial institutions. Indeed, the use of the term “bank” in most 
jurisdictions is restricted to companies duly authorized or regulated as financial institutions.
44
  
 
However, the Fintech 3.0 era has shown that financial services provision may no longer 
solely rest with regulated financial institutions. The provision of financial services by non-
banks may also mean there are no effective home regulators to act on the concerns of host 
regulators, and thus whether the provider is regulated or not may make little difference. This 
means that the last safeguard may come from consumer education and distrust of placing 
funds with a non-bank, off-shore institution.  
 
Yet, even this last constraint has been undermined since 2007, when the brand image of 
banks and their perceived stability was shaken to the core. A 2015 survey reported that 
American trust levels in technology firms handling their finances is not only on the rise, but 
actually exceeds the confidence placed in banks.
45
 For example, the level of trust Americans 
have in CitiBank is 37%, whilst trust in Amazon and Google respectively reaches 71% and 
64%. Of course, Amazon and Google are massive, well-established corporations. 
Nonetheless, there is an increasing number of non-listed companies and young start-ups that 
are handling customers’ money and financial data. China provides a clear illustration of this 
phenomenon,
46
 with over 2,000 P2P lending platforms operating outside of a clear regulatory 
framework.
47
  This does not deter millions of lenders and borrowers alike, who are willing to 
place or borrow billions on these platforms due to the cheaper cost, better return and 
increased convenience. Likewise, the “reputational” factors that mean only banks can offer 
banking services are not relevant for a large proportion of people in the developing world. 
                                                 
44
 See the sensitive words for UK company formations issued by the Companies House. The terms “banc”, 
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2015) Let’s talk payment, accessible via <http://letstalkpayments.com/survey-shows-americans-trust-
technology-firms-more-than-banks-and-retailers/>. 
46
 For a more in depth analysis of Financial Technology developments in China, see Weihuan Zhou, Douglas W. 
Arner & Ross P. Buckley “Regulation of Digital Financial Services in China: From last mover to first mover?” 
(Sept 2015) available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2660050>. For the more specific topics of shadow banking 
and P2P lending, see Douglas W. Arner & Janos Barberis, “FinTech in China: From Shadow Banking to P2P 
lending”, in Banking Beyond Banks & Money” (Springer 2015 forthcoming).   
47
 It is recognized that regulators in China (e.g. CBRC and PBOC) are due to announce new rules around the 
P2P industry mainly around credit-worthiness checks and regulatory capital requirements.  
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For over 1.2 billion unbanked individuals, this factor is weak, as to them banking may well 
be a commodity that can be provided by any institution, whether regulated or not.  
 
In other words, in developing markets there may well be a lack of “behavioral legacies”48 
whereby the public expects that only banks can provide financial services. For these 
populations, “banking is essentials, banks are not,” as it was rightly captured by Bill Gates in 
1994.
 49
 
 
4.  FinTech 3.0 (2009 – present): Democratizing Digital Financial Services? 
 
A mindset shift has occurred from a retail customer perspective as to who has the resources 
and legitimacy to provide financial services. Whilst it is difficult to identify how and where 
that trend started, it is possible to say that the 2008 Global Financial Crisis represents a 
turning point and has catalyzed the growth the FinTech 3.0 era.
50
  
 
As the remainder of this section will show, post-2008 an alignment of market conditions 
supported the emergence of innovative market players in the financial services industry. 
Among these factors are: public perception, regulatory scrutiny, political demand and 
economic conditions. Each of these points is now explored within a narrative that illustrates 
how 2008 acted as turning point and created a new group of actors applying technology to 
financial services.  
 
4.1 FinTech and the Global Financial Crisis: Evolution or revolution? 
 
The financial crisis has had two major impacts in terms of public perception and human 
capital. First, as the origin of the financial crisis became more widely understood, the public 
perception of banks deteriorated. For example, predatory lending methods targeting 
                                                 
48
 The term “behavioural legacies” echoes the “IT legacy systems” of banks that prevent them to fully digitize 
their process given the fact that their system are too-old-to-upgrade and too-expensive-to-replace. Indeed, until 
now most of banks IT spending was in maintenance as opposed to upgrade, however this gradually changing.  
49
 See Falk Rieker, “Does the future need banks?” (2 April 2013) SAP, available at 
<http://blogs.sap.com/banking/2013/04/02/does-the-future-need-banks/>  
50
 As it will be discussed in section 5.2, China’s FinTech development has a different origin, thus it as FinTech 
3.5. 
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disenfranchised communities not only breached the consumer protection obligations of 
banks, but also severely damaged their standing.
51
  
 
Second, as the financial crisis morphed into an economic crisis, an estimated 8.7 million 
American workers lost their jobs.
52
 Two sets of individuals were impacted by the financial 
crisis. On the one hand, the general public developed a distrust of the traditional banking 
system. On the other hand, many financial professionals either lost their jobs or were now 
less well compensated. This under-utilized educated workforce found a new industry, 
FinTech 3.0, in which to apply their skills.
53
 Last but not least, there is also the newer 
generation of highly educated, fresh graduates facing a difficult job market. Their educational 
background has often equipped them with the tools to understand financial markets, and their 
skills can be applied to FinTech 3.0.  
 
Post-financial crisis regulation has increased the compliance obligations of banks and altered 
their commercial incentives and business structures. In particular, the universal banking 
model has been directly challenged
54
 with ring-fencing obligations and increased regulatory 
capital changing the incentive or capacity of banks to originate low-value loans. Furthermore, 
the (mis)use of certain financial innovations, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
has been regarded as a contributor to the crisis by detaching the credit risk of the underlying 
loan from the loan originator. Finally, the necessity to ensure orderly failure of banks has 
driven the implementation of financial institution resolution regimes across jurisdictions, 
which required banks to prepare Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs) and conduct stress 
tests to evaluate their viability.
55
 As a result, since 2007, the business models and structures 
of banks have been re-shaped. 
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4.2 From post crisis regulation to FinTech 3.0 
 
These new regulatory obligations (e.g. Dodd Frank Act, Basel 3) are welcome in light of the 
social and economic impact of the financial crisis. It is now unlikely that the next financial 
crisis will be prompted by the same causes and impact the public is comparable ways.
56
 Yet, 
these post-crisis reforms had the unintended consequence of spurring the rise of new 
technological players and limiting the capacity of banks to compete.  
 
For example, Basel 3 translated into increased capital requirements. Whilst this enhanced 
market stability and risk-absorbing capacity, it also diverted capital from SMEs or private 
individuals. The latter may then have to turn to P2P lending platforms or other innovations to 
fulfil their need for credit.  
 
From a political perspective, increased unemployment and reduced availability of credit can 
directly challenge the legitimacy of elected representatives. This is the political motivation 
behind the Jump Start Our Business (JOBs) Act in the United States in 2012. The JOBs Act 
tackles these issues of unemployment and credit supply in two ways. On employment, the 
JOBs Act aims to promote the creation of start-ups by providing alternative ways to fund 
their businesses. The preamble of the act, states: 
An Act: To increase American job creation and economic growth by 
improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth 
companies.
57
 
From a policy perspective, there is little down side in promoting entrepreneurship as  it has a 
direct impact on job creation   
 
On financing, the JOBs Act assisted start-ups to by-pass the credit contraction caused by 
banks’ increased costs and limited capacity to originate loans. The JOBs Act made it possible 
for start-ups to raise directly the finance to support their business by raising capital in lieu of 
                                                 
56
 On what may cause the next crisis, and the inadequacy of regulatory reforms to date to avert it, see Ross P.  
Buckley, “Reconceptualizing Global Financial Regulation”, (Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2016 
forthcoming). 
57
 Complete version of the Act is available on the following link <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.pdf> 
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equity on P2P platforms. Figure 1 below shows the sharp increase in financing availability on 
online platforms: 
 
 
Figure 1: P2P lending platform industry revenue g 58 
 
The JOBs Act did not have the specific purpose of supporting FinTech 3.0, because it applied 
to start-ups in general. These alternative funding sources became available at a time that 
coincided with, on the one hand, increased regulatory pressures that limited banks’ capacity 
to innovate, and, on the other hand, with a public perception of traditional banks and human 
talent outflow, which provided the necessary market and knowledge for new FinTech start-
ups to emerge. 
 
In summary, the financial services industry since 2008 has been affected by a “perfect 
storm”, financial, political and public in its source, allowing for a new generation of market 
participants to establish a new paradigm known today as “FinTech”.   
 
4.3 The FinTech industry today: A topology 
 
On the basis of this evolutionary analysis, it is possible to develop a comprehensive typology 
for the FinTech industry. FinTech today comprises five major areas: (1) finance and 
investment, (2) operations and risk management, (3) payments and infrastructure, (4) data 
security and monetization, and (5) customer interface. In addition to these is the use of 
technology in regulation itself, the subject of Section 6 below. 
                                                 
58
 See Omar Khedr, “Peer-to-Peer Lending Industry to grow by 37.7% in 2015” (12 May 2015) Ibis World, 
available at < http://media.ibisworld.com/2015/05/12/peertopeerlendingrevenuetogrow/>  
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Finance and investment: Much of the public, investors and regulatory attention today 
focuses on alternative financing mechanisms, particularly crowdfunding and P2P lending. 
However, FinTech clearly extends beyond this narrow scope to include financing of 
technology itself (e.g. via crowdfunding, venture capital, private equity, private placements, 
public offerings, listings etc.). From an evolutionary perspective, the 1990s tech bubble is a 
clear example of the intersection of finance and technology, as is NASDAQ, the 
dematerialization of the securities industry which has followed over the succeeding decades 
and the advent of program trading, high frequency trading and dark pools. Looking forward, 
in addition to continuing development of alternative financing mechanisms, FinTech is 
increasingly involved in areas such as robo-advisory services. 
 
Financial operations and risk management: These have been a core driver of IT spending 
by financial institutions, especially since 2008 as financial institutions have sought to build 
better compliance systems to deal with the massive volume of post-crisis regulatory changes. 
From an evolutionary perspective, the development of finance theory and quantitative 
techniques of finance and their translation into financial institution operations and risk 
management was a core feature particularly of the 1990s and 2000s, as the financial industry 
built systems based upon VaR and other systems to manage risk and maximize profits. Going 
forward, this is clearly an area which is likely to continue to grow driven by costs and fines, 
an issue considered further in Section 6 below. 
 
Payments and infrastructure: Internet and mobile communications payments are a central 
FinTech focus and have been a driving force particularly in developing countries, an issue 
discussed further in Section 5 as underpinning FinTech 3.5. Payments have been an area of 
great regulatory attention since the 1970s, resulting in the development of both domestic and 
cross-border electronic payment systems, that today support the US$ 5.4 trillion per day 
global foreign exchange markets. Likewise, infrastructure for securities trading and 
settlement and for OTC derivatives trading continues to be a major aspect of the FinTech 
landscape, and are areas where IT and telecommunications companies are seeking 
opportunities to disintermediate traditional financial institutions. 
 
Data security and monetization: These are key themes in FinTech today especially as both 
FinTech 2.0 and FinTech 3.0 start to exploit the monetary value of data. Following the GFC, 
20 
 
it has become clear that the stability of the financial system is a national security issue. The 
digitized nature of the financial industry means it is particularly vulnerable to cybercrime and 
espionage, with the latter increasingly important in geopolitics. This digitization and 
consequent vulnerability is the result of decades of development, highlighted in previous 
sections, and, going forward, will remain a major concern for governments, policymakers, 
regulators and industry participants, as well as customers.
59
 At the same time, FinTech 
innovation is clearly present in the uses to which “big data” can be applied to enhance the 
efficiency and availability of financial services. 
 
Consumer interface, particularly online and mobile financial services. This will continue to 
be a major focus of traditional financial services and non-traditional FinTech developments. 
This is another area in which established and new IT and telecommunications firms are 
seeking to contest directly with traditional financial services firms; and, interestingly, it may 
well be in developing countries where factors increasingly combine to support the next era of 
FinTech development. This vertical holds the highest potential of competition with the 
traditional financial sector, as this tech companies can leverage of their pre-existing large 
customer bases to roll out new financial products and services.
60
 
 
5. FinTech 3.5 in Emerging Markets: The Examples of Asia and Africa 
 
FinTech 3.0 emerged as a reaction to the financial crisis in the West, but in Asia and Africa 
recent FinTech developments have been primarily prompted by the pursuit of economic 
development. We characterize the era in these two regions as FinTech 3.5. 
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5.1 FinTech opportunities and limitations in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
To appreciate Asian FinTech developments one must look beyond reported investment 
figures as Accenture estimates that out of the US$ 12 billion dollars in new investment in 
FinTech in 2014, only US$ 700 million has been invested in the APAC region.
61
  
 
Hong Kong and Singapore have seen the creation of three FinTech accelerators in less than a 
year, giving them one of the greatest concentrations of FinTech accelerators in the world. In 
Australia, a dedicated co-work space somewhat quaintly named Stone and Chalk received 
over 350 applications for 150 spaces.
62
 Korea is set to open an expanded version of Level 39 
(London’s prominent FinTech co-working space) in the coming months. On the regulatory 
side, most Asian regulators have initiated a FinTech strategy and met in Kuala Lumpur to 
discuss this alongside the World Capital Market Symposium in 2013.
63
 
 
The growth rate of the market is attributable to various factors. On the institutional side, IT 
spending by traditional banks has lagged behind levels in Europe and the US.
64
 This can be 
explained by the slightly less competitive regional market, still heavily controlled and 
distorted by state owned banks. Public distrust of the state-owned banking system (due to 
corruption and inefficiency) means the public is quick to accept alternatives provided by non-
banks. In terms of infrastructure the branch network distribution in the APAC region is far 
less extensive than in Europe and the US. There are 62.5 branches per 100,000 people in 
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Europe, but only 12.5 branches per 100,000 in APAC.
65
 As a result, mobile-based financial 
services and products are comparatively more attractive.
66
  
 
For China, the above analysis is supported by the government market reform process initiated 
in the late 1970s. In less than 30 years, China has gone from a mono-banking model to over 
80 banks and 2,000 P2P lending platforms. These figures do not include the additional five 
new private banks (e.g. Mybank, Webank) and the further 40 private banks that are 
expected.
67
 To put this in perspective, it took over a 150 years for a new retail banking 
license to be issued in the UK: Metro Bank in 2010.
68
 Furthermore, we should not expect 
growth to slow in China, especially with the government's recent Internet Finance Guidelines 
issued in July 2015.
69
 FinTech 3.5 in the developing world is supported by a strong 
underlying rationale, including, but not limited to, the following characteristics: (1) young 
digitally savvy populations equipped with mobile devices; (2) 60% of the world's middle 
class will be located in Asia by 2030; (3) inefficient financial and capital markets creating 
opportunities for informal alternatives; (4) shortage of physical banking infrastructure; (5) 
behavioral pre-disposition in favour of convenience over trust; (6) un-tapped market 
opportunities (1.2 billion people without bank accounts); and (7) less stringent data protection 
and competition. In addition, particularly in India and China, there are very large numbers of 
engineering and technology graduates. 
 
These trends are further reinforced by the interaction of a dynamic private sector looking to 
expand into financial services and a public sector welcoming market reform and 
diversification to drive economic growth. The implication of all this is that FinTech 
development in Asia is not a new post-crisis paradigm but instead is a combination of 
entrepreneurial and regulatory forces. 
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The potential for opportunity needs to be balanced with the challenges specific to the market 
and the region. Investors and networks in APAC are less sophisticated than in developed 
Western markets. There are large information asymmetries in market activity. Second, 
financing is not readily attainable, as there are high barriers to entry to retail banking (e.g. 
regulatory capital requirements, ownership structures, and market restrictions). Furthermore, 
as companies scale, the fragmented regulatory regime puts B2C FinTech companies at a 
disadvantage compared with B2B companies, particularly those that sell to banks, as they 
partially shift the compliance burden to the client.
70
  
 
The fragmented regime in APAC is also apparent when compared to Europe (24 countries in 
APAC compared to one harmonized market). Finally, financial engineering in APAC is less 
sophisticated than in the EU and US markets, which constrains certain FinTech companies.
71
 
For example, robo-advisory platforms on wealth management build portfolios for clients with 
small amounts of money. However, the level of tranching of financial products in the region 
is not yet at a level that allows for efficient “micro-portfolio” creation led by algorithms. 
 
Despite these limitations, it is clear that governments are beginning to adapt their policies and 
regulatory regimes to foster the development of FinTech companies. Efficient financial 
markets are directly linked to an increase in economic output, which is a key motivator for 
developed and developing countries.
72
 
 
5.2 China: Transitioning its financial market for the 21
st
 century 
 
For China specifically, technology has already blurred customer perceptions of who can 
deliver a financial service. The deposit of money for payments is no longer reserved to 
deposit accounts at banks. Holding client deposits traditionally has flagged an institution as a 
bank and attracted the concomitant licensing and regulatory obligations. However this no 
longer seems to be the case as China’s AliPay processes over one million transactions each 
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day without being a bank.
73
 Payments can be made using deposits held in a Yu’E Bao74 
account which yields an interest rate and is redeemable on-demand. 
 
Regulators and legislators must face this fast-changing environment. Banks should be 
allowed
75
 to respond directly to the competitive challenges of less regulated internet finance 
companies, that can gain significant market share
76
 by offering close substitutes for certain 
financial services. Unlike in the West, internet companies in China are a real threat to the 
market share of banks. 
 
The benefits of internet finance companies require consideration. Alibaba has fulfilled two 
main government policy objectives by creating 2.87 million direct and indirect job 
opportunities, and providing over 400,000 SMEs with loans ranging from $3,000 to $5,000.
77
 
Regulators need to strike a difficult but important balance in the current competitive dynamic 
between banks and internet finance companies.  
 
China has been gradually reforming its financial system since 1978. However, the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008 slowed down the appetite of politicians and regulators for further 
large-scale reform, as the crisis deeply shook the understanding of what constitutes an 
effective financial system and how institutions should be regulated. Indeed, legislation since 
2008 has reversed the trend towards a free market, by tightening the regulatory environment 
for banks in China. In the West, this is reflected by ever-increasing compliance costs from 
newly-passed national laws (such as Dodd-Frank) or international standards (such as Basel 
3).    
 
There is a unique opportunity in the technologically driven financial transition currently 
underway in China. As well as learning from regulatory mistakes in Western countries, China 
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might decrease the financial efficiency and inclusion gains brought by technology as compliance costs will 
increase.  
76
 In that respect, McKinsey & Company expect that banks failing to digitize themselves face the possibility of 
having a 29% to 36% negative impact on their profits. Source: 
<www.mckinsey.com/insights/financial_services/How_to_prepare_for_Asias_digital_banking_boom>    
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 L. Shrader and E. Duflos, ‘China: a New Paradigm in Brancheless Banking’ (March 2014), CGAP, pp. 37, 42. 
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could leapfrog financial regulation standards by having its regulatory authorities establish a 
framework to promote and control the use of FinTech and internet finance companies.
78
  
 
In many ways this is already happening at the industry level with developments in China now 
leading innovation in the financial sector, with new processes that are being replicated 
globally. For example Alipay’s introduction of facial recognition payment in March 201579 
was followed by MasterCard in July 2015.
80
 Similarly SME lending by Alibaba in 2010 using 
alternative credit-scoring data from its e-commerce platform, was introduced in the US and 
Japan in 2012 and is now being undertaken by Amazon in Europe.
81
   
 
These market developments echo the wider government objective of reforming the financial 
sector and promoting opportunities offered by digital financial services. The latest 
development was in July 2015 with the issuance of the Guidelines on the promotion of the 
healthy development of Internet Finance (hereinafter, The Internet Finance Guidelines) by 
ten ministries and commissioners.
82
 
 
China’s transition is both demand-driven and policy-driven. In addition, certain 
characteristics of the Chinese market make it particularly fertile ground for FinTech. World 
Bank statistics show how China differs when it comes to by whom and via what channels 
banking is delivered: 
 
 China USA UK 
Population without a Bank account in the last 12 months 432 10 1 
                                                 
78
 See Weihuan Zhou, Douglas W. Arner and Ross P. Buckley “Regulation of Digital Financial Services in 
China: From last mover to first mover? (Sept 2015) available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2660050>; Douglas 
W. Arner and Janos Barberis “FinTech In China: From shadow banking to P2P lending”, in Banking Beyond 
Banks & Money” (Springer 2015 forthcoming) (illustrating how China went from innovation to duplication and 
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Fortune, available at <http://fortune.com/2015/03/17/alibabas-jack-ma-shows-off-new-pay-with-a-selfie-
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 See Jose Pagliery, “Mastercard will approve purchases by scanning your face” (1 July 2015) CNN, available 
at <http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/01/technology/mastercard-facial-scan/>  
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 See Oliver Smith, “Looking for a UK Business loan? Amazon might be the answer” (29 June 2015) The 
Memo, available at <http://www.thememo.com/2015/06/29/looking-for-a-uk-business-loan-amazon-might-be-
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82
 Guan Yu Cu Jin Hu Lian Wang Jin Rong Jian Kang Fa Zhan De Zhi Dao Yi Jian (Guideline on the Promotion 
of the Health Development of Internet Finance), promulgated on 18 July 2015. The Chinese official version of 
the Guideline is available at  
<http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefabu/201507/t20150720_1332370.htm> 
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(nominal in million) 
Population without a Bank account (percentage) 36% 2.7% 2.5% 
Commercial Bank Branch per 100,000 people
83
 7.7 35.2 24.2 
Bank ATM per 100,000 people
84
  37.51 173.43 124.28 
Table 1: Banking Demographic and Delivery Channels85 
China has not had time to develop Western levels of physical banking infrastructure and the 
rise of FinTech means it probably never will need to do so. This is particularly so because 
technology is well developed in the country: 
 
Number of SIM cards 1,104 million  
Percentage of mobile subscribers with 3G/4G access 28.9% 
Internet Users  618 million 
Online Banking penetration 40.5% 
Table 2: Technology Penetration in China (in 2012) 86 
The result of this mismatch between physical and digital infrastructure means the future for 
digital financial services in China is particularly bright. Already China UnionPay has, in 
under 15 years, become the world’s largest payments provider.87  
 
The lack of physical infrastructure and of customer expectations regarding banking 
constitutes an opportunity, which could see the development in China of a new paradigm in 
banking. The trend toward digital banking is already underway. Over the past three years in 
China, there have been 111 million new Internet banking customers, a 19% increase in new 
personal bank accounts, and a 24% increase in online payments.
88
 In addition, it is expected 
that by 2020 there will be 900 million digital banking customers, compared to 380 million in 
2012.
89
 Likewise, it is expected that by 2017 over 900 million Chinese will be credit scored 
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84
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85
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 See The Nilson Report, “China UnionPay overtakes Visa to become the world’s most used debit card” (10 
April 2014) Finextra, available at    
<http://www.finextra.com/news/announcement.aspx?pressreleaseid=54849>  
88
 See Accenture, ‘Every Day Bank in China’ (2015) page 3,  available at 
<https://www.accenture.com/t20150714T065456__w__/sk-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-
Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Strategy_6/Accenture-The-Everyday-Bank-A-New-Vision-for-the-
Digital-Age.pdf>  
89
 See Sonia Barquin and Vinayak HV, “Capitalizing on Asia’s digital-banking boom” (March 2015) McKinsey, 
available at <http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/financial_services/capitalizing_on_asias_digital-
banking_boom> 
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by the new credit bureau, Sesame Credit Management, part of Alibaba, using alternative data 
points.
90
  
 
Going forward, one should expect that the tension between traditional digital financial 
services and FinTech 3.0 providers will be greatest around the following three areas: (1) 
payments, (2) financing, and (3) deposits, with the last of these being the strongest contention 
point (and perhaps the main threshold for strong regulation).
91
  
 
To support this digital financial transition, a framework must achieve various goals for each 
actor in the financial sector. Regulators must secure the necessary understanding and scope of 
operations to oversee the use of technology within the financial industry. Banks should 
compete equally in terms of regulatory burden with FinTech 3.0 companies which offer exact 
or close substitutes for regulated products. At the same time, start-ups need to operate within 
a regulatory framework that allows them to develop their business before becoming subject to 
expensive compliance costs. 
 
Thus, the way forward may not necessarily lie in setting rules for financial products, but 
instead may lie in establishing threshold levels for when institutions need to comply with 
conduct rules for small actors, or prudential rules for larger players. This may avoid 
burdensome regulation with heavy compliance costs and limited benefits for financial 
stability. This would also help establish a boundary of operation between banks and internet 
finance companies and determine whether the distinction is based on products or transaction 
size.  
 
                                                 
90
 See Andrew Foxwell, “Asia loses out as FinTech start-ups head to the West” (2 June 2015) Asian Investor, 
available at <http://www.asianinvestor.net/News/397928,asia-loses-out-as-fintech-start-ups-head-to-the-
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 To date, deposit taking activities have not been approached by FinTech 3.0 start-ups. This reflects the fact that 
it is one of the most regulated activities within the financial services industry as it requires a banking licence. In 
turn this removes much of the economic rationale behind performing this function since the fact of holding 
deposits on its own generates little of no return. This would push start-ups to create two products from day one 
so as to up-sell products and services to make up for the cost generated by their deposit business. 
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In this respect, it seems that China’s current Internet Finance Guidelines and the consultation 
on third party payments which is due to be released before this year’s end92 are pointing 
towards a two-tiered market, defined by transaction values. This is an imperfect solution as it 
caps the growth of internet finance providers, yet it may introduce a measure of regulatory 
harmony between traditional financial institutions (FinTech 2.0) and new start-up participants 
(FinTech 3.0).  
 
Jack Ma, founder and CEO of Alibaba, rightly captured this difference when he said:  
There are two big opportunities in future financial industry. One is online 
banking, all financial institutions go online; the other one is internet 
finance, which is purely led by outsiders.
93
  
 
Regionally this is echoed in the development of tiered licensing systems in Asia, with 
governments in the region developing “light license” models that aim to minimize regulatory 
and compliance costs for firms seeking to deliver specific banking activities to certain 
population segments. For example, South Korea is developing a specific regime for online-
only banks,
94
 India has created a new license type for payment banks
95
 and has recently 
issued 11 new banking licenses
96
 and China is introducing new private banks to cater for 
market sectors traditionally underserved by state-owned banks.
97
  
 
These developments matter because they reflect the FinTech dynamic of the region and 
indicate a regulatory policy that favors the development of specific sub-sectors to promote 
national policy objectives. 
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 See Xinhua Finance, “China Headlines: New Regulation on third-party payments stirs controversy” (3 August 
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 See Bernard Lunn, “11 new banking licences approved in India show the future of banking” (29 September 
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 See Xinhua, “Mainland’s 1st private bank services niche markets” (27 March 2015) Shanghai Daily, available 
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5.3 Africa: Greenfield opportunities for FinTech 
 
Africa shares many characteristics with the APAC region in terms of FinTech development, 
however, the nature and direction of the primary developments in this area in Africa have 
been somewhat different. The reach of banks in Africa is even more circumscribed than in 
Asia. At most 20% of African households have any access to formal or semi-formal financial 
services as compared to some 60% of households in Asia.
98
 As a result, telecommunications 
companies, rather than banks, have tended to take the lead in FinTech developments in the 
region. Mobile money, the provision of basic payment and savings services by a creation of 
e-money recorded on a mobile phone, while initially pioneered in the Philippines has 
achieved its greatest success in Kenya and, more recently, Tanzania. In both of these 
countries the rise and extent of mobile money has assisted economic development 
significantly by providing customers with a  means to save funds, remit money safely to their 
families, pay bills, and receive government payments safely and securely. 
The most well-known success story in Africa is that of M-Pesa, the mobile money product of 
Safaricom, which was launched by Vodafone in 2007. In under five years payments made 
through the platform surpassed 43% of Kenya’s GDP99 and the central bank is now having to 
supervise the provider carefully as the payments platform has become systemically 
significant. 
Indeed the phenomenal success of M-Pesa has caused problems in many other countries, 
where companies offering mobile money services need to have as the screen saver on every 
corporate computer screen a prominent warning:  “Be aware – we are not in Kenya” for many 
other countries have had to learn that merely replicating what was done in Kenya does not 
necessarily lead to similar customer take-up of digital financial services. For digital financial 
services (DFS) to prosper, the services offered have to be tightly tailored to local needs.
100
 
Meeting the needs of the local consumers, whatever they may be, is the key requirement for 
success in providing DFS – and this is not the starting point for many of the people designing 
the DFS products coming, as they most often do, from an IT background.  
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Nonetheless, Africa’s FinTech journey to date has mostly consisted of the provision of 
mobile money services permitting the core functions of payments and savings, and relatively 
recently the higher order services of credit and micro-insurance.   
The typical African provider of DFS is a telecommunications company that encourages 
customers to purchase e-money, as well as airtime, on their mobile phone; and usually in the 
same way and at the same place as buying airtime (i.e. by paying cash to a retail agent), who 
is typically a small shopkeeper who sells e-money and airtime, along with soft drinks, snacks 
and the like. This profile is rather similar to mobile money developments in some Asian 
nations, such as Cambodia, Laos, and others, but dramatically different to the profile of DFS 
in China, or India. With that said it is expected to see an increase amount of South-South 
technology transfers within FinTech.
101
  
 
6.  Regulatory Innovation and the Importance of RegTech 
 
This paper has illustrated the application of technology to finance and its consequences over 
three major eras of FinTech. The main divergence witnessed today is between FinTech 2.0 
and FinTech 3.0, particularly in the type of entity that uses the technology to deliver a 
financial product or service. FinTech is no longer the preserve of traditional financial 
institutions.  
 
A visual illustration of this is provided in the table below, as each of these names are 
regarded as FinTech companies in their own right: 
 
Rank 
FinTech 2.0 FinTech 3.0 
Banks                         
by market cap (2015) 
IT Companies 
by revenue (2014) 
Start-ups 
by valuation (2015) 
1
st
  Wells Fargo & Co (US) FIS (US) LuFax (CN) 
2
nd
  ICBC (CN) Tata (IN) Square (US) 
3
rd
 JP Morgan (US) Fiserv (US) Markit (US) 
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 See Gulveen Aulakh “Alibaba, Ant Financial invest about $680 million in Paytm, up stake to 40%” The 
Economic Times, available at 
<http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/alibaba-ant-financial-invest-about-
680-million-in-paytm-up-stake-to-40/articleshow/49148651.cms>  
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4
th
  CCB (CN) Cognizant (US) Stripe (US) 
5
th
 Bank of America (US) NCR Corp (US) Lending Club (US) 
6
th
  Bank of China (CN) Infosys (IN) Zenefits (US) 
7
th
  ABC (CN) Diebold (US)  Credit Karma (US) 
8
th
 Citi Group (US) Sungard (US) Powa (UK) 
9
th
 HSBC (UK) Nomura (JP) Klarna (SWE) 
10
th
  Mitsubishi (JP) CA Tech (US) CommonBond (US) 
Table 3: Ranking of FinTech 2.0 and 3.0                                                                                                                 
Compiled by the authors102 
 
On the one hand, as explained in sections 2 and 3, financial institutions’ transition towards 
digitizing their processes and services is a well-understood market trend with defined 
regulatory implications and obligations related to the use of technology. Established financial 
actors, technology companies and regulators work with each other. On the other hand, new 
technology players (FinTech 3.0) are entering the financial industry with limited or no pre-
existing interaction with financial regulators. These businesses tend to lack a financial 
compliance culture that identifies providers’ prudential or consumer protection obligations 
when delivering financial services.
103
  
 
As a result, the non-traditional business models or financial products offered by FinTech 3.0 
companies may not comply with applicable financial regulations. This lack of regulatory 
compliance may be active as when a technology company does not believe it should be 
subject to rules and regulations meant for banks, or passive as when a technology company is 
not aware of the rules and regulations that may apply.  
 
This is precisely where the current debate and discussion around FinTech regulation lies. 
Right now there is uncertainty as to what laws and procedures are applicable to new FinTech 
                                                 
102
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understand regulated markets with compliance cultures. This is highlighted by looking at where FinTech 
companies are founded. Start-ups close to financial centers such as New York, London or Hong Kong tend to 
have stronger compliance cultures than those in other locations such as Silicon Valley where the founders are 
more likely to be engineers than finance professionals.   
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solutions. The solution is to be found in devising an approach that balances the views of each 
party (e.g. the technology industry, financial actors and regulators) and is proportionate to 
their obligations. Performing this balancing act requires one to understand the raison d’etre 
of regulators and the reasons behind the rules they enforce and to provide education for for 
start-ups on their regulatory obligations.  
 
6.1 Regulatory objectives and thresholds 
 
Regulators’ objectives can be understood by their key mandates. In no specific order, these 
are: (1) financial stability, (2) prudential Regulation, (3) conduct and fairness, and (4) 
competition and market development. Furthermore the issue of when to regulate can be as 
important as what to regulate, so that some rules may not be enforced until certain specific 
thresholds are met. This was seen in Section 2.2.1 in the regulation of e-banking which 
existed for about 20 years before it was properly regulated. 
 
Earlier regulation may well have represented substantial wasted effort. E-banking was 
introduced in 1980 in the US but stopped shortly thereafter, before being reinstated 
successfully in 1995 in the UK. E-banking is a good example of why regulators should move 
slowly in regulating innovations. Regulators diverting their resources to understand every 
new technological innovation could result in inefficient outcomes for regulators and industry. 
 
First, technology needs time to find its final use and applicability, and the market may need to 
settle before regulatory intervention.
104
 Second, the availability alone of a technology does 
not mean it will be widely adopted.
105
 Third, there may be a strong benefit in regulatory 
measures not influencing market innovation or technological standards. Indeed, regulators 
should remain technology-neutral. 
 
In practice, this means regulators need to categorize and understand the benefits and 
applicability of a technology. For example, new biometric identification mechanisms entering 
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 Going forward regulators should not rely on technological adoption lag. Indeed, Rita McGrath, in “The Pace 
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the market (e.g. fingerprint and iris scanning, voice or heartbeat recognition) raise different 
case-specific issues, but are all used for the same purpose of customer identification.  
 
Finger print scanning appears to be the simplest and most widely used biometric 
identification method. However, it raises issues of “biometric data theft” where a fingerprint 
can be replicated using a simple high resolution photograph.
106
 This risk recently 
materialized, when 5.6 million finger prints were stolen from the US defense department.
107
 
A case can thus be made against using fingerprints due to the security risk.
108
 
 
However, the decision to allow or ban a technology is perhaps best not left to regulators 
because until a specific technology becomes widely used, risks of biometric data-theft and 
un-authorized transactions are limited. Instead, in most instances, regulators should remain 
technologically neutral and focus on the outcome of a technology.
109
 A wait-and-see 
approach allows the regulator to learn whether the market will adopt the technology, and 
draw on historical data as to the risks a specific technology creates.  
 
This efficiency analysis of regulators’ time, given their constrained resources, highlights the 
benefits of supervising and regulating only a limited number of large players. In FinTech 2.0, 
technological innovations were generally developed by actors with an established compliance 
culture and thus it was seen as more efficient to let a market self-regulate until it became 
worthy of regulators’ time.110 Whilst the innovations themselves were new, the actors 
deploying them were not (e.g. Barclays’ ATM, Bank of America’s credit card, investment 
bank VAR models), and thus regulators could take comfort from knowing they had a point of 
contact for when they decided to look at the legal implications of specific technologies.  
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 This raises an important questions and potential risks in the context of China. Indeed the data privacy regime 
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Europe or the US. Thus there is a potential cybersecurity risk of having private companies losing the biometric 
data of their consumers following an attachment, especially if these are used an identification token for financial 
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 However, this is not the case of all regulators, as discussed with the Singaporean example.   
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 This is not to say that actors within the financial sector have a flawless track record of compliance, as was 
shown with the various fraud cases emerging out of the 2008 financial crisis. 
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This approach can be cost-effective for regulators, and industry, as it experiment with 
initiatives until they become sufficiently important to attract regulatory scrutiny.  
 
From an industry and regulatory perspective, the pharmaceutical industry perhaps offers a 
blueprint for regulating innovation. This industry is, similarly to financial services, highly 
regulated. Breakthroughs are allowed via a clear and gradual path of clinical trials and 
authorizations. Large groups are increasingly outsourcing this R&D stage of the process by 
acquiring the start-ups and university spin-offs which are developing the new drugs. 
 
Parallels arise with the financial industry, albeit in a less coordinated manner. FinTech 3.0 
innovations are emerging out of sand-boxes, incubators or accelerator programs where start-
ups refine their solutions. Graduating from these accelerators flags that the company has to 
some extent matured given its participation in a structured curriculum. Banks then partner 
with, invest in, or acquire these companies.   
 
There are also benefits for regulators, as their previous method, whereby they only look at 
established financial institutions that start to deploy products or services on a significant 
scale, is challenged under the FinTech 3.0 model. Whilst pre-2007, regulators could take 
some comfort that regulated financial institutions with which they already had a relationship 
would handle innovations responsibly, this is no longer necessarily the case.  
 
Money market funds (MMF) offer an example. Three of the largest players in this sector 
(Vanguard, Fidelity and Schwab) were established in 1975, 1946 and 1971 respectively. In 
2014 an e-commerce business in China, Alibaba, started to offer a new MMF that is fully 
online and available to its pre-existing customer base. Within nine months, Yu’E Bao became 
the world’s 4th largest MMF, on par with decade-old players such as Vanguard or Fidelity.111  
 
Yu’E Bao shows how a non-traditional financial institution went from “too-small-to-care” to 
“too-big-to-fail”112 within the space of nine months. This exponential growth represents a 
direct challenge to the otherwise more gradual approach towards regulating innovations and 
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stakeholders, skipping the “too-large-to-ignore” phase when regulators would have started to 
contact and request compliance of the said entity
113
 
 
Figure 2: Regulatory threshold approaches compared to growth models                                                                                                                
Source: Arner and Barberis: “FinTech Regulation Recent Developments and Outlook (1 April 2015) AIIFL  
 
In other words, if primarily regulating actors with a significant impact on financial markets 
remains the correct approach, which we submit is the case, what needs to change in 
extraordinary cases may be the methods used to identify in time the future systemically 
important actors.
114
  
 
Given the size of investment and the competitive implications stemming from the arrival of 
these new players in the financial services industry, regulators in various jurisdictions also 
need to review the best approaches to support FinTech and adjust their methods (e.g. rule or 
principle-based) towards regulation.
115
  
 
 
                                                 
113
 Following the fingerprint example, one can also use the fact that Apple sold over 10 million iPhone 6, which 
were all pre-loaded with a mobile wallet and finger print scanner to identify transactions, See Press Release, 
“First Weekend IPhone sales top 10million, set new record” (22 September 2014) Apple, available via 
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2014/09/22First-Weekend-iPhone-Sales-Top-10-Million-Set-New-
Record.html>  
114
 It is accepted that not all companies will become too-big-to-fail and reach the scale of Yu’E Bao but most 
have the aspiration of being billion dollar company. Furthermore in an ever interconnected financial system 
market size and systemic risk are not necessarily correlated. The Dow Jones flash crash in May 2010 illustrate 
that smaller players can also become systemic. 
115
 The advantages and disadvantages of each method are well covered in Chris Brummer and Daniel Gorfine 
“FinTech: Building a 21st Century Regulator’s Toolkit” (2014) Milken Institute, available via 
<http://assets1c.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/Viewpoint/PDF/3.14-FinTech-Reg-Toolkit-NEW.pdf>  
36 
 
 
 
6.2 Adapting regulatory methods in a digital age 
 
From an industry perspective and from a regulatory perspective alike, an attitude change is 
needed towards how FinTech products and services should be regulated. However, as pointed 
out above, there is currently difficulty in accurately representing the hardship faced by the 
industry as a whole, since it is comprised of established players (bankers, FinTech 2.0) and 
emerging players (start-ups, FinTech 3.0).  
 
This creates two sets of distinct expectations and needs in respect to how industry players’ 
activity should be supervised. From a start-up perspective, the high cost of regulation (e.g. 
due to compliance, license applications, etc.) is incompatible with their lean business model. 
At an early stage start-ups need to defer expenses as much as possible to focus on building a 
viable product with business potential. The group of early-stage companies that emerged 
during FinTech 3.0 prefers the more flexible compliance obligations of a principle-based 
regulatory regime. Under this regulatory approach, more focus is given to the spirit of a 
regulation rather than “box ticking”. This seems to be the route taken in the UK. Private 
parties subject to this regime may have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the 
regulation.  
 
Principle-based regulatory regimes differ from rule-based regimes. The latter create clear 
rules and processes. From a start-up perspective, this approach is expensive as each rule and 
process needs to be identified and complied with,
116
 which may significantly consume 
financial resources of a start-up that could instead be used to build the business. 
 
The benefits of principle and rule-based approaches are however not clear from the 
perspective of start-ups and large financial institutions. The flexibility of a principle-based 
model creates a level of uncertainty as to what exactly is expected in terms of compliance.
117
 
As for the rule-based approach, the fact that the compliance obligations are clearly set out can 
limit the incentive of the supervised entity to do more because the obligations are perceived 
as sufficiently comprehensive. 
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There is nonetheless a way of resolving the differences between not only principle and rule-
based regulatory approaches, but also between traditional financial institutions (FinTech 2.0) 
and start-ups (FinTech 3.0). The solution may lie in going beyond a strict reading of the text 
so that regulatory approaches, whether rule-based or principle-based, are not seen as mutually 
exclusive.   
 
For example, whilst a principle-based approach may provide a start-up with the benefit of 
flexibility at an early stage, this may create limitations in terms of scalability of a business. 
Regulatory clarity and certainty are not only important for large institutions but also for 
investors into start-ups.
118
 For start-ups, the legal predictability and higher compliance costs 
associated with a rule-based model may be balanced by being more attractive to investors. 
Then, as the start-up matures, so does its compliance culture and capacity as it has increasing 
access to sufficient financial resources. The higher costs and complexity associated with a 
rule-based approached can thus be understood as a benefit, both for the company and the 
investor. Indeed, rules-based regulatory approaches are more likely to create a barrier to entry 
for subsequent new competitors.
119
 
 
The regulatory obligations of a company should be dynamic in the sense they need to adapt to 
the size and activity of a business as it grows and changes.
120
 The P2P industry offers a case 
study. Many businesses start as a platform as agents introducing lenders to borrowers and are 
not involved in the loan itself. This is important for P2P debt FinTech 3.0 start-ups because it 
means they may have limited regulatory obligations. However, this operational model also 
limits their capacity to scale as it relies on always being able to match the exact needs of a 
borrower with the liquidity of a lender. From a risk angle, the matching also exposes the 
lender to the direct credit risk of the borrower. Since the platform is only an agent as opposed 
to a principal, it is not responsible for any losses resulting from a partial or complete default.  
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This shifting of risk towards the lender has two consequences. First, if an increasing amount 
of lender(s) lose their capital as a result of a badly evaluated credit risk, their confidence in 
the platform will fall and they will not likely re-use it.
121
 Second, the risk profile of such a 
liquidity placement on a P2P platform is much higher given that the risk is directly passed on 
to the lender. As a result, this limits the number of potential lenders since the increase in 
return is accompanied by an increase in risk.  
 
Therefore, for P2P lending platforms to maintain user confidence and attract a wider lender 
base, it may well be necessary to move away from a purely agent-based model and instead 
come principal-based model.
122
 Alternatively, the platform may wish to spread the credit risk 
of the borrower by originating a loan using the liquidity of various lenders. This limits the 
credit risk of each lender to its chosen contribution. Additionally, the ease (e.g. convenience 
and speed) of borrowing over P2P platforms and the lack of co-ordination among platforms is 
creating a risk of over indebtedness among borrowers.
123
 
 
The P2P sector offers a good example of how regulation needs to proceed carefully when 
creating rules for an industry.
124
 Industry demands may represent nothing more than a 
snapshot in time of their difficulties and may fail to address the evolving nature of their 
business as it grows in terms of market size and risk.  
 
FinTech 3.0 thus needs a framework that is both balanced and dynamic, benefiting 
simultaneously private stakeholders (e.g. institutional or start-ups) and regulators.  
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6.3 A case for the development of RegTech 
 
While previous sections considered the evolution of FinTech and its challenges for traditional 
regulation, this section turns to the application of technology to regulation itself: Regulation 
Technology (RegTech). The relevance of discussing RegTech echoes the fact that, with the 
increased use of technology within the financial services industry, regulatory bodies have the 
opportunity to access a level of granularity in risk assessments that did not previously exist. 
Indeed, Andy Haldane, Chief Economist of the Bank of England, when discussing the future 
of regulation shared his vision:  
What more might be feasible? I have a dream. It is futuristic, but realistic. It 
involves a Star Trek chair and a bank of monitors. It would involve 
tracking the global flow of funds in close to real time (from a Star Trek 
chair using a bank of monitors), in much the same way as happens with 
global weather systems and global internet traffic. Its centre piece would be 
a global map of financial flows, charting spill-overs and correlations
125
 
 
This vision of a data-led regulatory system is not new. Since 2007 there has been increased 
focus on this from regulators, industry and academia. In 2009 the SEC created the division 
for Economic and Risk Analysis, to look at using data insights for better regulation; and 
Peppet published a paper on “smart mortgages” that use data to limit the default risks.126 
However, one needs to balance the opportunities presented by technology with practical 
barriers to actual and successful implementation, which are discussed below. 
 
Regulatory interest in the FinTech sector represents a turning point. No longer are regulators 
solely seeking to prevent the previous crisis and instead are looking at how to support future 
market developments whilst maintaining financial stability. There are benefits for a regulator 
from early interaction with new FinTech start-ups, even if they are not yet significant or able 
to (currently) comply with the rules. This provides regulators the capacity to understand from 
early-on the business models of FinTech 3.0 start-ups, and the teams behind them (so as to 
see whether they are fit and proper for that role). This has been the approach in various 
jurisdictions. For example, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) not only initiated a 
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consultation to understand the regulatory hurdles faced by FinTech 3.0 companies,
127
 but also 
complemented it with an innovation hub to interact with and support innovative start-ups 
from a nascent stage.
128
   
 
This awareness phase is also seen in Asia. The Securities and Futures Commission of Hong 
Kong is part of the Hong Kong government's FinTech Steering Group
129
, AISIC in Australia 
has open hours in a co-working space
130
, the Monetary Authority of Singapore has made SG$ 
225 million investment in research,
131
 whilst southeast Asian countries have implemented 
new rules on alternative finance (debt or equity), with Malaysia being the first ASEAN 
country to have crowdfunding laws.
132
 
 
The effort and resources regulators are putting into understanding the FinTech sector is 
perhaps surprising, particularly as they are to some extent revisiting the same questions and 
risks identified over 15 years ago with e-banking.  Furthermore, apart from specific products 
(e.g. robo-advisory), the business models of FinTech companies are not radically different 
from their traditional counterparts (e.g. P2P lending emanating from shadow banking in 
China).
133
 At most, the efficiency is driven by lower overhead costs, or disintermediation. To 
some extent FinTech is going full circle and providing only incremental changes, both from 
industry and regulatory perspectives. 
 
6.4 Real-time compliance and RegTech 
 
As discussed above, the financial sector has been the largest spender on IT systems for 
decades, a trend likely to continue, especially in respect to regulatory and compliance 
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spending. In the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the regulatory onus and level of 
scrutiny by regulators has dramatically increased. Indeed, regulators have moved towards a 
risk-based approach where access to data is key to prudential supervision. Gutierez has 
analyzed how data is playing an increasing role in ensuring financial institutions are held 
accountable for their actions, and their responsibility is quickly established.
134
 This appears to 
be a laudable development.
135
  
 
For financial institutions all of this regulatory activity has meant cost increases, whether in 
terms of capital (e.g. Basel 3), operations (e.g. human resources), or penalties (e.g. HSBC, 
UBS, etc.). On the last point alone, since 2008, banks in the west have been fined over 
US$242 billion.
136
 Arguably, both industry and regulators share an interest in reducing fraud. 
A range of stakeholders are interested in increasing transparency and creating monitoring 
processes. In June 2015 the Bank of England issued its Fair and Effective market review, 
looking at the role that technology may play in compliance,
137
 noting that:  
Firms have started to make progress in response to the limitations of 
existing surveillance solutions, including the use of new technology and 
analytics which go beyond the key-word surveillance and simple statistical 
checks previously used by firms to detect improper trading activity and 
discussed earlier in this section.
138
 
 
In particular, the Bank of England highlighted the following added values for regulation of 
specific technologies:
 139
  
 
 Pattern analysis which can be used to identify unusual patterns of activity, such as 
“spoofing” (placing an order and then cancelling it seconds later to encourage others 
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to drive up the price of a particular asset), front running and wash trades, using 
predefined patterns of trading behaviour; 
 “Big data” techniques, which typically use a far larger number of inputs than 
standard surveillance techniques, helping to straddle information silos. The algorithms 
used have the potential to detect a wider range of suspicious activity than pattern 
analysis, and can also be used to identify networks of trading and communications 
activity which may themselves identify vulnerabilities; 
 Predictive coding, which looks to identify patterns of activity, such as unusual use of 
communication, non-routine patterns of leaving the office, non-completion of 
training, or missing mandatory leave, which may flag potential conduct concerns, and 
 Digitalization of voice communications, which some firms claim has the potential to 
be more effective than analysing written communications. 
 
As a result, the argument for cost reduction within the compliance sector is very strong, and 
RegTech has never looked so beneficial for firms. Yet, one also needs to be balanced in 
assessing what is currently feasible when it comes to fully automating regulatory and 
compliance systems.
140
  
 
Before looking at the conversion of compliance obligations into IT processes the first 
question is more fundamental – how should financial technology itself be regulated?141 To 
date the debate, especially in Asia, seems to be more on understanding what framework 
provides the right balance between market innovation and market confidence.
142
  
 
Furthermore, whilst in the West RegTech has been developed much more by regulators (the 
UK government dedicated a chapter of the Blackett Review
143
 to the topic and Europe is 
pushing towards increased data transparency with PSD2) in practice there are still 
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uncertainties, as reported by Brummer and Gorfine, as to whether or not principle-based 
approaches are better suited than rule-based approaches.
 144
  
 
To understand regulator’s activity, one needs to look at two factors. First, at the macro level 
their interest reflects the need to guide the transition occurring in financial markets. Just as an 
abrupt transition towards liberalized financial markets can be detrimental for participants and 
consumers, so can a fast technological transition create new risks. For example, the 
simplification and automation of wealth management services into color-coded advisers,
145
 
provides a simpler and cheaper solution for end-users. However, this also creates new risks as 
it moves away from a full disclosure regime and threatens jobs within the industry.  
 
At the micro level, the increasingly data-driven aspects of FinTech 3.0 and the fact that these 
young companies rely on new and transparent IT systems allows them to explore new 
compliance mechanisms.
146
 For example, real-time compliance systems could be requested as 
part of the licensing process. This would provide regulators and the company with a way to 
monitor in quasi-real time the actions of its staff and identify any non-compliant behaviour. 
In that scenario the firm wins because it limits its risk of misconduct and so does the 
regulator with better regulatory outcomes.
147
   
 
From a market perspective, the capacity to analyze in real time the solvency, liquidity and 
risk of a financial institution promotes both market stability and competition. Regulatory 
models where data is traded-off with regulatory capital could provide a more appropriate cost 
of market entry for new companies. Their level of regulatory capital and scrutiny could then 
gradually increase as their business growth as opposed to fall under the current blanket 
licensing system.
148
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7. Conclusion 
 
This paper has illustrated the evolution of FinTech through three major eras, culminating in 
today’s FinTech 3.0, characterized by new competition and diversity, bringing both 
opportunities and risks to be carefully considered. 
 
In developed markets, this shift to FinTech 3.0 has emerged out of the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2008 and been driven by public expectations and demands, the movement of technology 
companies into the financial world and political demands for a more diversified banking 
system. In contrast, in developing countries and particularly Asia, FinTech 3.5 has been 
driven by the needs of development and the inefficiencies in the existing financial system, 
combined with the rapid introduction and reach of new technology, particularly mobile 
communications. 
 
In both cases, the development of the FinTech sector is attracting the interest of regulators 
who are currently evaluating the best ways to support market developments, while ensuring 
the development of the sector contributes to, and does not threaten, core mandates such as 
systemic stability, consumer protection and market competition The challenge lies in 
resolving the tension between having a flexible, forward-looking framework that promotes 
innovation, and the framework being clear enough to maintain market, consumer and investor 
confidence.  
 
There seem to be two approaches in that respect. On the one hand, the UK in the wake of the 
Global Financial Crisis has changed its regulatory structure, moving away from a product-
based to a principle-based approach, focusing on prudential regulation and consumer 
protection. China, on the other hand, has maintained product-based principles but is gradually 
introducing a two-tiered system where small to medium transactions can be handled by 
internet finance companies, while larger transactions remain in the remit of (State-owned) 
institutional players. 
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In either case, the shift by regulators to a forward-looking, from a retrospective, approach is 
to be welcomed as it should allow markets to become more efficient and competitive, 
ultimately yielding benefits for consumers and the economy. While different approaches are 
being employed, this raises the potential for common international approaches to FinTech 
regulation, to maximize market opportunity while at the same time setting best practices for 
managing risks to financial stability and consumer protection, similar to those that have been 
applied in the context of payment systems and other forms of regulation by the international 
standard setters.
149
 Such a common approach, if implemented, could open the stage for a new 
era in FinTech. However, just as the issue of when to regulate new technology can be as 
important as how to regulate it, in our view, the time has not yet come to move to 
internationally standardized regulatory approaches in this sector. More experimentation and 
innovation is needed in regulatory approaches and in RegTech, before the time will be ripe to 
seek their standardization. 
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